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This Article discusses developments relating to the Texas law of
intestacy, wills, estate administration, trusts, and other estate planning
matters during the Survey period of December 1, 2019, through
November 30, 2020. The reader is warned that not all newly enacted
statutes or decided cases during the Survey period are presented, and not
all aspects of each statute or case are analyzed. You must read and study
each statute or case’s full text before relying on it or using it as precedent.
The discussion of most cases includes a moral, that is, the important
lesson to be learned from the case. By recognizing situations that resulted
in time-consuming and costly litigation in the past, the reader may be able




If a step-child wants assurance that he or she will be treated as a legal
child of a step-parent when adoption is not (or cannot be) done while the
child is a minor, the step-child should be legally adopted upon reaching
the age of majority. Taking this step will avoid the problem that arose in
In re Estate of Hines.1 The trial court conducted a determination of heir-
ship and concluded that the intestate did not equitably adopt a step-son,
and thus he was not an heir.2 The step-son appealed.3
The Sixth Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed.4 The court examined
evidence that showed that the step-son began living with the intestate
when he was about ten years old.5 Friends and neighbors described the
interactions between the intestate and step-son.6 They appeared to be
how a step-father and a step-son would normally interact.7 There was also
evidence that the step-father had told the step-son and other family mem-
bers that he agreed to adopt the step-son.8 However, there was no evi-
dence that the biological father agreed to terminate parental rights while
the step-son was a minor, and the step-son took no legal steps to have his
step-father adopt him upon reaching majority.9 Importantly, all the step-
son’s legal documents used his own last name and not the step-father’s
name.10
The court then explained that much more evidence is needed to
demonstrate an equitable adoption. Equitable adoption may exist “when
1. See No. 06-20-00007-CV, 2020 WL 5948803, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 8,
2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at *6.
5. Id. at *1.
6. Id. at *1–2.
7. Id.
8. Id. at *3.
9. Id. at *3–4.
10. Id. at *3.
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[a person’s] efforts to adopt [a child] are ineffective because of failure to
strictly comply with statutory procedures or because, out of neglect or
design, agreements to adopt are not performed.”11 The court upheld the
trial court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence of the type of
agreement needed to trigger an adoption by estoppel.12 Evidence of a
close relationship similar to that of a parent and child itself is not enough.
II. WILLS
A. SELF-PROVING AFFIDAVIT
The validity of a self-proving affidavit was placed in doubt in In re Es-
tate of Flarity, because the notary admitted that she did not give the testa-
trix and the witnesses an oral oath, just a written one.13 Both the trial
court and Ninth Beaumont Court of Appeals rejected this argument be-
cause Texas Estates Code § 251.104 does not require the oath to be
oral.14 Because the Estates Code does not define the term “oath,” the
Code Construction Act provision applies, which provides that the term
oath “includes the oath in an affidavit.”15
B. INTERPRETATION
1. Devise of Named Property
The importance of a testator expressly stating whether the surface es-
tate, mineral estate, or both are included in a real property gift is demon-
strated by the Texas Supreme Court case of ConocoPhillips Co. v.
Ramirez.16 A dispute arose whether a provision in the testatrix’s will de-
vised only the surface estate or both the surface and mineral estates.17
Both the trial and appellate courts held that the testatrix devised both
estates.18 However, the supreme court reversed, holding that the testatrix
only devised the surface estate.19
The provision in question provided the testator devised “all . . . right,
title and interest in and to Ranch ‘Las Piedras.’”20 The supreme court
summarized a complex series of land transactions over a period of ap-
proximately eighty years.21 The supreme court then took notice of the
fact that the testator placed the name of the ranch in quotes, supporting
the argument that the term had a specific meaning to the testatrix and her
11. Id. at *4.
12. Id. at *6.
13. In re Estate of Flarity, No. 09-19-00089-CV, 2020 WL 5552140, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Sept. 17, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
14. Id. at *9.
15. Id.; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 602.001.
16. See 599 S.W.3d 296, 297 (Tex. 2020).
17. Id. at 300.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 297.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 297–300.
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family.22 By examining extrinsic evidence of the surrounding circum-
stances such as prior partition agreements using the ranch’s name, which
expressly stated that mineral interests were not covered, the supreme
court determined that the testatrix intended to devise only the surface
estate.23
2. Personal Property
Estate of Hunt v. Vargas (In re Estate of Hunt) makes it clear that the
term “personal property” unambiguously encompasses both tangible and
intangible personal property.24 The testator’s will made a gift of all of his
“remaining household and personal property” to a specific beneficiary.25
Both this beneficiary and the remainder beneficiaries claimed that they
were entitled to intangible personal property such as bank accounts and
stocks.26 The trial court granted summary judgment that the specific ben-
eficiary’s gift included the intangible personal property.27 The remainder
beneficiaries appealed.28
The First Houston Court of Appeals affirmed.29 The court explained
that the term “personal property” is not ambiguous.30 Personal property
refers to all property, tangible or intangible, that does not qualify as real
property.31 “The legal definition of ‘personal property’ is so well estab-
lished that it generally does not allow for an interpretation other than the
one ascribed to it by the law.”32 The court also rejected the argument that




A person attempting to contest a will based on undue influence needs
to raise a fact issue as to whether the will is valid to prevent summary
judgment from being upheld. For example, in In re Estate of Grogan, the
testator was single and had no descendants.34 However, he had a lifetime
companion with whom he had lived for decades.35 The testator’s will left
substantially all of his estate to his companion to the exclusion of his sib-
22. Id. at 301.
23. Id.
24. See Estate of Hunt v. Vargas (In re Estate of Hunt), 597 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.).




29. Id. at 914.
30. Id. at 917.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 916–17.
33. Id. at 917–20.
34. In re Estate of Grogan, 595 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.).
35. Id.
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lings and their descendants.36 The siblings contested the will on the
ground of undue influence.37 The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the companion, determining that there was no evidence of
undue influence.38 One of the siblings appealed.39
The Sixth Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed.40 The court examined
the evidence in tremendous detail, holding that there was no fact issue
regarding undue influence or that the testator had revoked the will.41 The
court explained that not even a scintilla of probative evidence existed on
these issues.42 Instead, it appeared the siblings were merely upset that
they were excluded from the will.43
2. Standard of Review
Unless a jury finding is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or
clearly demonstrates bias, an appellate court will uphold findings of un-
due influence and lack of good faith. For example, in In re Estate of Scott,
both the trial court and Eighth El Paso Court of Appeals agreed that the
testator’s three alleged wills were executed due to undue influence.44
Also, they agreed that the proponents of the wills did not act in good
faith in defending the wills and, accordingly, were not entitled to attor-
ney’s fees under Texas Estates Code § 352.052.45
The opinion is not significant from a legal point of view; the court ap-
plied the standard principles regarding the finding of undue influence,
providing an excellent summary of the key Texas cases. Instead, it is the
detailed factual description of the testator’s mental and physical condi-
tion and the will beneficiaries’ conduct that became the focus of the
court’s opinion.46 The outrageous conduct of the will proponents led the
appellate court to agree that the jury had sufficient evidence, both factu-
ally and legally, to support a finding that all three wills were the result of
their exercise of undue influence over the testator.47
The court also examined the will proponents’ request for over
$400,000.00 in attorney’s fees for defending the contests of the wills. The
court agreed that the jury had sufficient evidence to support its finding
that the proponents did not act in good faith or with just cause.48
36. Id.
37. Id. at 811–12.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 812.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 813–21.
42. Id. at 821.
43. See id.
44. In re Estate of Scott, 601 S.W.3d 77, 82 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.).
45. Id. at 98–99.
46. See id. at 92–93.
47. See id. at 98.
48. Id. at 99.
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3. Discovery
In re Estate of Flarity serves as a reminder that a will contestant should
carefully tailor discovery requests based on the issues relevant to the pro-
bate of the will.49 In an attempt to delay or prevent the probate of a self-
proved will, the testatrix’s disfavored child requested discovery of sixty-
three categories of documents covering a period of over twenty years.50
The will proponents successfully persuaded the trial court that the discov-
ery request was overbroad, and the Ninth Beaumont Court of Appeals
agreed.51 The court explained that the discovery request did not deal with
the matters relevant to admitting a self-proved will to probate under
Texas Estates Code §§ 256.151 and 256.152.52
III. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
A. STANDING
In In re Estate of Burns, the testator’s will devised the bulk of his estate
to his cousin who predeceased the testator.53 The successors in interest to
the cousin’s estate asserted that the Texas anti-lapse statute would save
the lapsed gift in their favor, and thus they have standing to be involved
in disputes involving the testator’s estate.54 However, because the cousin
is not a descendent of the testator or of the testator’s parents, the anti-
lapse statute would not prevent this gift from lapsing.55 Accordingly, the
court held that the cousin’s successors in interest did not qualify as inter-
ested persons under Texas Estates Code § 22.018, and thus they lacked
standing under Texas Estates Code § 55.001 to assert a claim in the testa-
tor’s probate proceeding.56 The court also refused to interpret the will to
provide an alternate gift to the cousin’s successors in interest because to
do so would prevent the property from passing by intestacy.57
49. See In re Estate of Flarity, No. 09-19-00089-CV, 2020 WL 5552140, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Sept. 17, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
50. Id.
51. Id. at *1, *7.
52. Id. at *5 (explaining that relevant matters include whether “(1) the testator is
dead, (2) the testator died less than four years ago and the Applicants filed the application
within four years of the testator’s death, (3) the probate court has jurisdiction and venue
over the estate, (4) citation has been served and returned in the manner and for the period
required by the Estates Code, (5) the proposed administrators of the estate have a right to
letters of administrations and are not disqualified, and (6) the testator never revoked the
will”); see also TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 256.151–.152.
53. In re Estate of Burns, No. 04-19-00284-CV, 2020 WL 354940, at *1 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Jan. 22, 2020, pet. denied).
54. Id.; see TEX. EST. CODE § 255.153.
55. In re Estate of Burns, 2020 WL 354940, at *3.
56. Id.
57. Id. at *4.
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B. APPEAL
1. No Final Judgment
A probate judgment must dispose of all parties or issues in a particular
phase of a probate proceeding before it is appealable. For example, in
Bethany v. Bethany, a disgruntled successor executor unsuccessfully at-
tempted to remove the primary independent executor.58 On appeal, the
Third Austin Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction to hear the ap-
peal because the trial court’s judgment was not final.59 The court ex-
plained that the disgruntled successor executor’s motion for removal also
included claims for attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses.60 The trial court
did not address these claims, and thus, the order refusing to remove the
executor did not dispose of all the issues in that phase of the probate
proceedings.61
2. Pro Se
Kankonde v. Mankan clarifies that only licensed attorneys may re-
present a decedent’s estate at trial or on appeal.62 The Eighth El Paso
Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal for want of prosecution because
the appellants, the decedent’s estate and a corporation, did not obtain an
attorney to pursue the appeal.63 The court explained that “a non-attorney
cannot litigate an appeal on behalf of an estate or a corporate entity.”64
The decedent’s wife was not an attorney, and thus the appellate brief she
filed had no legal effect.65
C. CREDITORS
West Texas LTC Partners, Inc. v. Collier demonstrates that once a
claim is barred in a guardianship proceeding, that claim cannot rise again
like the Phoenix in an estate proceeding.66 Both the trial court and Four-
teenth Houston Court of Appeals agreed that a creditor was barred from
recovering its claim from the decedent’s estate.67 The decedent accrued a
debt while under guardianship.68 The guardian properly notified the cred-
itor that it had 120 days to file a claim against the guardianship or other-
wise be barred as authorized under Texas Estates Code § 1153.003.69 The
58. Bethany v. Bethany, No. 03-19-00532-CV, 2020 WL 1327398, at *1 (Tex. App.—




62. See Kankonde v. Mankan, No. 08-20-00052-CV, 2020 WL 5105806, at *2 (Tex.




66. See W. Tex. LTC Partners, Inc. v. Collier, 595 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 309.
69. Id.; see TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1153.003.
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creditor did not file a claim in the guardianship proceeding.70 After the
decedent died, the creditor submitted an authenticated claim for the same
debt.71
The courts agreed with the independent administratrix that the claim
was barred because the creditor did not timely file the claim in the guard-
ianship proceeding after receiving a proper § 1153.003 notice.72 The court
rejected the creditor’s argument that it could recover on its claim because
it timely filed its claim in the estate proceeding under Texas Estates Code
§ 355.001 and that § 1153.003 applies exclusively to claims in a guardian-
ship.73 The appellate court explained that § 1153.004 barred the claim be-
cause the creditor did not timely file its claim in the guardianship
proceeding.74
D. DISCHARGEABILITY OF JUDGMENT AGAINST INDEPENDENT
EXECUTOR
Harrison v. Reiner explains that only a bankruptcy court can determine
whether a debt owed by an estate’s personal representative is dischargea-
ble if the representative files for bankruptcy.75 The trial court order pro-
vided that a judgment against an administratrix would not be
dischargeable in bankruptcy.76 The Fourteenth Houston Court of Ap-
peals explained that bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction to de-
termine whether a debt is dischargeable.77 Accordingly, the court
modified the judgment to remove the improper language.78
IV. TRUSTS
A. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
1. Ability to Amend
In Younger v. Younger, a husband and his wife established a revocable
trust that excluded one of their three children.79 After the husband died,
his wife amended the trust to disinherit another child.80 This child sued,
claiming that the wife’s amendment was contrary to the terms of the trust
or, at least, that the trust’s terms were ambiguous.81 The trial court held
that the trust was unambiguous, becoming irrevocable upon the hus-
70. W. Tex. LTC Partners, Inc., 595 S.W.3d at 309.
71. Id. at 310.
72. Id. at 312.
73. Id. at 311–12.
74. Id. at 312.
75. See Harrison v. Reiner, 607 S.W.3d 450, 454 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2020, pet. denied).
76. Id. at 457.
77. Id. at 461.
78. Id.
79. Younger v. Younger, No. 07-19-00039-CV, 2020 WL 6253237, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Oct. 22, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
80. Id. at *2.
81. Id.
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band’s death, and thus awarded the child a share of the trust property.82
The Seventh Amarillo Court of Appeals first agreed with the trial court
that the trust amendment was ineffective, although the trust authorized
the surviving settlor to amend the trust “by restating [the provisions] in
full.”83 While alive, amendments had to be made jointly except as to each
person’s separate property.84 The trust also provided that the terms of the
trust regarding administration and distribution became irrevocable upon
the first settlor’s death.85
However, the appellate court disagreed with how the trust terms ap-
plied to a specific parcel of property.86 Under one provision, the trustee
appeared to have the power to distribute the husband’s property to the
wife notwithstanding the child’s remainder interest.87 However, this con-
flicted with another provision that appeared to make property distribu-
tion irrevocable upon the husband’s death.88 Thus, this ambiguity
required a trier of fact to resolve the issue.
2. Definition of “Spouse”
The settlor should designate a beneficiary by actual name, not just by
relationship, because the relationship may change over time. For exam-
ple, in Ochse v. Ochse, the settlor named her son’s “spouse” as a benefici-
ary of an irrevocable trust.89 A dispute arose whether the son’s first wife,
his spouse at the time the settlor created the trust, or his current wife is
the actual beneficiary.90 The trial court granted summary judgment, find-
ing that the son’s ex-spouse was the beneficiary because the settlor in-
tended to benefit her daughter-in-law at the time of trust creation.91
The Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed.92 The court held
that the trust designation of the settlor’s spouse was unambiguous.93 Her
son had been married to his first wife for approximately thirty years at
the time of trust creation.94 The court rejected the claim that the settlor
used the term “spouse” to refer to the status of being the son’s wife and
instead was used to refer specifically to the son’s spouse at the time of
trust creation.95
However, the court did not hold that the ex-wife had a vested interest
82. Id.
83. Id. at *3.
84. Id. at *4.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *6.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Ochse v. Ochse, No. 04-20-00035-CV, 2020 WL 6749044, at *1 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Nov. 18, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
90. Id.
91. Id. at *3.
92. Id. at *5.
93. Id.
94. Id. at *4.
95. Id. at *5.
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in the trust by being the son’s spouse at the time of trust creation.96 The
court claimed that the irrevocability of the trust did not make her interest
vested.97 However, this author believes that her interest was vested—she
was born, ascertainable, and there were no conditions precedent on her
interest, making her interest contingent.
B. STANDING
In Berry v. Berry, an unnamed contingent beneficiary of a trust at-
tempted to bring various actions regarding the trust, such as to require an
accounting, remove the trustee, and seek recovery for breach of fiduciary
duty.98 The Thirteenth Corpus Christi–Edinburg Court of Appeals deter-
mined that she lacked standing despite Texas Property Code § 111.004(6),
which includes someone with a “contingent” interest within the scope of
an interested person.99 The court said her interest was no greater than
that of an heir apparent or beneficiary of a living person.100 It is this au-
thor’s opinion that this case was incorrectly decided. Unlike an heir ap-
parent or beneficiary of a living person, a contingent beneficiary of a trust
currently owns a contingent interest in the trust.
C. TRUST PROTECTORS
Ron v. Ron serves as a reminder that unless the terms of the trust pro-
vide otherwise, a trust protector does not owe fiduciary duties to the set-
tlor of an irrevocable trust who is not also a beneficiary.101 An ex-wife
claimed that the ex-husband, the trustee, improperly transferred commu-
nity property into an irrevocable trust she created and that the trust pro-
tector assisted him in making the transfers during marriage.102 Also, the
trust protector, using the authority granted to him as the protector, ap-
pointed the ex-husband as a beneficiary of the trust.103 The ex-wife
claimed, among other things, that the trust protector breached his fiduci-
ary duties to her.104
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas examined
the ex-wife’s claim that a formal fiduciary relationship existed between
her in her capacity as the trust’s settlor and the trust protector.105 The
court agreed that the protector was a fiduciary because of the express
language in the trust so providing.106 However, those fiduciary duties are
96. Id. at *5 n.1.
97. Id.
98. Berry v. Berry, No. 13-18-00169-CV, 2020 WL 1060576, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg Mar. 5, 2020, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
99. Id. at *4; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004(6).
100. Berry, 2020 WL 1060576, at *4.
101. See Ron v. Ron, No. 3:19-CV-00211, 2020 WL 1426392, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 4,
2020).
102. Id. at *1.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *2.
105. Id. at *5–8.
106. Id. at *5.
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owed to the trustee and beneficiaries, not the settlor. The court was not
swayed by the terms of the trust, which indicated that the protector’s du-
ties were to achieve her “objectives as expressed by the other provisions
of [her] estate plan.”107
D. TRUSTEE POWERS
Pense v. Bennett demonstrates that the determination of whether the
trustee had the power to make a transfer of property is distinct from
whether the exercise of that power was proper.108 The trial court granted
summary judgment, finding that the trustee had the power under the trust
instrument and the Trust Code to convey certain real property.109 On ap-
peal, the beneficiary claimed that the summary judgment was improper
because of his allegation that the transfer was in breach of the trustee’s
fiduciary duty.110 The Sixth Texarkana Court of Appeals rejected this
claim because the trial court did not consider the issue of whether the
transfer was in breach.111 In fact, the judgment clearly provided that the
“[c]ourt makes no findings or determinations” on that issue because it is
being litigated in a case pending in another court.112
E. CO-TRUSTEE POWERS
Absent trust language to the contrary, a majority of co-trustees may
administer trust property over the objection of a minority of the co-trust-
ees. For example, in Duncan v. O’Shea, the majority of the co-trustees
agreed to sell several parcels of trust real property.113 They successfully
obtained a declaratory judgment under the Texas Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act declaring that they had the power to do so under the terms
of the trust and Texas Property Code § 113.085(a).114 The trustee who
opposed the sale appealed.115 The Seventh Amarillo Court of Appeals
affirmed.116 The court first rejected the dissenting trustee’s claim that a
declaratory judgment must resolve all issues in dispute.117 The court
stated that there was no legal authority to support this claim.118 In addi-
tion, Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 37.003 expressly states that
the court has the jurisdiction to declare rights “whether or not further
relief is or could be claimed.”119
107. Id.
108. See Pense v. Bennett, No. 06-20-00030-CV, 2020 WL 5948801, at *7 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana Oct. 8, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
109. Id. at *2.
110. Id. at *3.
111. Id. at *7.
112. Id.
113. Duncan v. O’Shea, No. 07-19-00085-CV, 2020 WL 4773058, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Aug. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
114. Id.; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001–.011.
115. Duncan, 2020 WL 4773058, at *1.
116. Id. at *6.
117. Id. at *2.
118. Id.
119. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.003(a); Duncan, 2020 WL 4773058, at *3.
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The court also rejected the dissenting trustee’s claim that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to decide whether a majority of the trustees
could sell the trust property.120 The court pointed to Texas Property Code
§ 115.001(a), which grants the district court jurisdiction over a wide vari-
ety of trust matters, including “a question arising in the administration . . .
of a trust.”121
The court also recognized that the trust instrument did impose certain
restrictions on the sale of trust assets.122 However, the declaratory judg-
ment did not involve the approval of any particular sale.123 Instead, it was
merely a determination that the majority of the trustees had the power to
sell.124
F. FORMER TRUSTEE LIABILITY
Benge v. Roberts demonstrates that a properly drafted exculpatory
clause may remove a successor’s duty to sue prior trustees for breaches of
trust.125 A beneficiary sued the successor trustee for alleged breaches of
trust committed by the former trustee.126 The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the successor trustee based on the exculpatory
provision of the trust, which provided:
No successor Trustee shall have, or ever have, any duty, responsibil-
ity, obligation, or liability whatever for acts, defaults, or omissions of
any predecessor Trustee, but such successor Trustee shall be liable
only for its own acts and defaults with respect to the trust funds actu-
ally received by it as Trustee.127
The beneficiary appealed.128
The Third Austin Court of Appeals affirmed.129 The court first cited
Texas Property Code § 114.007(c), which allows the settlor, with some
exceptions not relevant to this case, to relieve the trustee from a duty or
restriction imposed by the Trust Code or common law.130 The court ex-
plained that this provision relieved the successor trustee of the normal
duty under Texas Property Code § 114.002(3) to “make a reasonable ef-
fort to compel a redress” of breaches the predecessor trustee
committed.131
120. Duncan, 2020 WL 4773058, at *3–4.
121. Id. at *4; see TEX. PROP. CODE § 115.001(a).
122. Duncan, 2020 WL 4773058, at *5.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Benge v. Roberts, No. 03-19-00719-CV, 2020 WL 4726688, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Austin Aug. 12, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
126. Id. at *1–2.
127. Id. at *3.
128. Id. at *2.
129. Id. at *4.
130. Id. at *3; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.007(c).
131. Benge, 2020 WL 4726688, at *3; see TEX. PROP. CODE § 114.002(3).
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V. OTHER ESTATE PLANNING MATTERS
A. REMOTE NOTARIZATION OF WET SIGNATURES
Many documents require the client’s wet signature because the Texas
version of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, which authorizes
electronic signatures on a wide variety of documents, does not apply to
most estate planning documents.132 Accordingly, notaries commissioned
as Online Notary Publics cannot perform online notarizations of these
documents. As a temporary solution to this problem, considering stay-at-
home orders and the imposition of social distancing due to COVID-19,
Governor Abbott temporarily suspended the requirement that a client
must physically appear in front of a notary for self-proving affidavits, du-
rable powers of attorney, medical powers of attorney, directives to a phy-
sician, and oaths of executors, administrators, and guardians.133 A notary
must comply with the following requirements to remotely notarize a wet
signature:
•A notary public shall verify the identity of a person signing a docu-
ment at the time the signature is taken by using two-way video and
audio conference technology.
•A notary public may verify identity by personal knowledge of the
signing person, or by analysis based on the signing person’s remote
presentation of a government-issued identification credential, includ-
ing a passport or driver’s license, that contains the signature and a
photograph of the person.
•The signing person shall transmit by fax or electronic means a legible
copy of the signed document to the notary public, who may notarize
the transmitted copy and then transmit the notarized copy back to the
signing person by fax or electronic means, at which point the notariza-
tion is valid.134
The order remains in effect until the Governor’s office terminates the
order or the March 13, 2020, disaster declaration is lifted or expires.135
Documents properly executed during the suspension period remain valid
thereafter.
However, several important estate planning documents that may re-
quire notarization are not covered, such as mental health treatment dec-
larations and agents for body disposition.
132. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 322.003(b)(1).
133. Press Release, Greg Abbott, Governor, State of Texas, Governor Abbott Tempo-
rarily Suspends Certain Statutes to Allow for Appearance Before Notary Public via Vide-
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B. ANNUITY PROCEEDS
In re Estate of Scott demonstrates the importance of annuity companies
to make certain they include express provisions in their contracts requir-
ing a joint annuitant to notify the company when the other joint annui-
tant dies.136 A husband and his wife invested in an annuity that would
make payments for their joint lives.137 However, upon the death of the
first to die, each payment amount would be approximately 50% less.138
After the wife died, the husband continued to receive payments as if the
wife were still alive because he did not give the annuity company notice
that his wife had died.139 After the husband died, the fact that his wife
had died ten years prior came to light, and the annuity company made a
claim against the estate for reimbursement of the overpayments.140 The
husband’s independent executor rejected the claim.141 The annuity com-
pany then sued alleging breach of contract and fraud.142 The trial court
found in favor of the annuity company, and the independent executor
appealed.143
The Fourth San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed.144 The court ex-
plained that although the annuity contract clearly explained that upon the
death of the first spouse, payments would be reduced, there was no ex-
press provision requiring that a surviving spouse notify the annuity com-
pany about the deceased spouse’s death.145 Although it would have been
reasonable to imply this obligation, the court refused to do so.146 The
court explained that implied covenants are not recognized even if doing
so would make the contract fair or that the contract would operate in an
unjust manner without the implication.147 Likewise, the court refused to
imply an obligation to repay amounts received in excess of the contrac-
tual amounts.148 Basically, the court blamed the annuity company for not
including an express provision requiring notification.149 Plus, the court
explained, the annuity company should monitor death records to ascer-
tain if an annuitant has died.150
The court justified its decision on two other grounds. First, the statute
of limitations had run on the annuity company’s equitable claim for
136. See In re Estate of Scott, No. 04-19-00592-CV, 2020 WL 2736466, at *4 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio May 27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).







144. Id. at *6.
145. Id. at *3.
146. See id.
147. Id. at *3–4.
148. Id. at *4.
149. Id.
150. See id. at *5.
2021] Wills & Trusts 351
money had and received.151 Second, the husband did not commit a fraud-
ulent act by not revealing his wife’s death because he had no legal duty to
tell the annuity company that she had died.152 The fact that he may have
had a moral duty to do so was irrelevant.
VI. CONCLUSION
The new cases address a wide array of issues, some very narrow and
some with potentially broad impact. This Article has already discussed
the practical application of many of the cases and statutes. It is also im-
portant to understand some overarching principles that transcend individ-
ual cases and form a pattern. Here are some examples of patterns this
author detected:
(1) Poor drafting of wills, by attorneys or the testators themselves, is a
prominent cause for appellate litigation regarding the interpretation of a
will in Texas. For example, while “personal property” has an obvious le-
gal meaning, that did not stop (presumably costly) litigation about what it
means.153 Just the appearance of ambiguity can lead to expensive and
unnecessary litigation;
(2) As with most estate planning matters, formalizing an intimate, fam-
ily-like relationship is essential so the person in the relationship has the
opportunity to receive any kind of inheritance.154 For example, many
people only know and treat one of their stepparents like a biological par-
ent. However, if that stepparent does not properly plan his or her estate,
the stepparent may leave the stepchild nothing upon death, and this situa-
tion may be extremely painful and unfair to the stepchild;
(3) Long-shot lawsuits to recover from estates and litigation tactics
that show an intent to harass or unnecessarily prolong an unadvisable
lawsuit will usually lead to summary disposition and large attorney’s
fees.155 The effort will have expended large sums of money to no party’s
advantage, and the plaintiffs will probably not recover any attorney’s fees
or court costs;
(4) Especially for rural and familial estates of real property, the attor-
ney should keep in mind the possible severance (or lack thereof) of the
surface and mineral estate. An ancestor’s fifty-acre estate could be di-
vided among hundreds of persons, and a subsequent decedent may not
have any right to the mineral estate. As seen in ConocoPhillips Co. v.
Ramirez, a gift of real property only conveyed the surface estate as the
family ranch name had a specific meaning156;
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. See Estate of Hunt v. Vargas (In re Estate of Hunt), 597 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.).
154. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hines, No. 06-20-00007-CV, 2020 WL 5948803, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana Oct. 8, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
155. See, e.g., Bethany v. Bethany, No. 03-19-00532-CV, 2020 WL 1327398, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Austin Mar. 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Estate of Hunt, 597 S.W.3d at 912.
156. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Ramirez, 599 S.W.3d 296, 301 (Tex. 2020).
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(5) Even though many lay persons serve as an estate’s executor, and
there is an increasing number of pro se litigants in the court system (even
outside of probate matters), only a licensed attorney can represent an
estate on an appeal157;
(6) Creditors and other interested parties to an estate or a living per-
son entering a guardianship proceeding should timely seek claims against
the estate or guardianship proceeding when given notice and at first op-
portunity.158 There may be a later and alternative method for a creditor
to recover, but the creditor should seek recovery at the first opportunity
or face the potential of a non-recovery; and
(7) Adding to the importance of good drafting, when drafting a will or
trust document, the attorney should avoid using some generic familial
terms like “spouse,” and should include the specific beneficiary by name
or a family term that would not cause debate as to its meaning such as
“father.”159
157. See Kankonde v. Mankan, No. 08-20-00052-CV, 2020 WL 5105806, at *2 (Tex.
App.—El Paso Aug. 31, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
158. See W. Tex. LTC Partners, Inc. v. Collier, 595 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied).
159. See Ochse v. Ochse, No. 04-20-00035-CV, 2020 WL 6749044, at *5 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Nov. 18, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
